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Abstract
Guasch  and Kogan  find that raw materials  inventories in  interest  rates and uncertainty), are  the main determinants
the manufacturing  sector  in the  1970s and 1980s were  and explain these differences.  Cross-country  estimations
two to three times  higher in developing countries  than in  show that a one standard  deviation worsening of
the United States, despite the fact that in  most  infrastructure  increases raw materials  inventories by 11
developing countries  real interest rates were at least  percent to 37 percent, and a one standard deviation
twice as high. Those significantly high levels of  worsening of markets increases  raw materials inventories
inventories  are a burden and an obstacle  to country  by 18 percent  to 37 percent.  These  findings  are robust
competitiveness  and need  to be addressed. Poor  across a number of different  proxies  and specifications,
infrastructure  and ineffective regulation,  as well  as  including an  industry-level  specification  that controls for
deficiencies  in market  development,  rather than the  fLxed country effects.
traditional factors used in  inventory models  (such  as
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Although anecdotal evidence and some case studies (Quir6s [1996], Gulyani
[2000]) suggest that inventories  are higher in developing countries,  there are almost no
systematic  studies that have documented  and quantified the difference  and attempted  to
explain this phenomenon. This is relevant because high inventory  levels impact adversely
unit cost and competitiveness.  This study uses newly-assembled  data for 51  countries  in
the early 1970s and 1980s to draw out some stylized facts about the pattern  of inventory
holdings.  The summary statistics from that data set illustrating  the high inventory levels
in developing countries  and their significant  cost to the economy is the motivation for
this paper.
U.S. businesses typically hold inventories equal  to about  15% of GDP while
inventories in many developing countries,  as we document  here,  are often twice  as large,
and in raw materials, are often three times as large.  The impact of those inventory levels
on firm unit costs and on country competitiveness  is extraordinarily  significant.  First are
the financial cost associated with inventories, and those can be quite high since cost of
capital  in developing countries  is usually well above  15 percent.  Second are the other
associated costs of inventories,  such as taxes, insurance, obsolescence  and storage, that
can  add another 5 percentage points.  Table  I illustrates the magnitude of those cost
indicating  an  average cost of  19.25 percent,  and standard range for those costs
between  9 and  50 percent, pointing the urgency of lowering inventory  levels.  Putting
things into perspective, if the  interest rate for financing inventory  holdings is  15%-20%,
a conservative estimate in most developing countries,  then the cost to the economy of the
additional inventory holdings is greater than  2% of GDP.  Suppose that firms in
developing  countries keep high inventories in response to poor infrastructure,  which we
find in this study to be a key determinant.  Then, as an example, consider that the total
transport infrastructure  stock in Bangladesh  is about 2% of GDP (World Bank [1994])
while this figure is about  12% in the United States (Munnell  [1992]).  One year's worth
of savings in inventory holding costs would be enough to double Bangladesh's
infrastructure stock; the infrastructure  improvement  could pay for itself.
Table 1:  Inventory Carrying Cost Components
Component  Average  (%)  Range (%)
Capital Cost  15.00  8-40
Taxes  1.00  0.5-2
Insurance  0.05  0-2
Obsolescence  1.20  0.5-2
Storage  2.00  0-4
Total  19.25%  9-50%
Source:  Bowersox and Closs (1996)
These calculations are merely a lower bound on the cost of the additional
inventory as a result of three other types of costs that we have not measured.  First is the
missing economic  activities costs; there are certain  transactions that would have been
3worthwhile  were it not for the high inventory holdings necessary to complete them
effectively.  It is difficult to estimate the size of these lost transactions.  Second, firms in
developing countries  will take costly steps to mitigate the institutional  or structural
factors creating  a need for high inventories.  Gulyani [2000] describes  how Maruti, an
Indian automaker, tries to decrease inventory costs by encouraging  its suppliers to locate
nearby through  government-sponsored  incentive packages and the building of supplier
parks.  Fisman and Khanna [1998]  describes co-location  by business group affiliates  to
overcome infrastructure  shortages.  A numerical example helps to clarify this point.
Suppose that for a particular firm, 30 days of inventory  are sufficient when transportation
networks are well developed  but 90 days of inventory  are required  when transportation
networks  are poor.  The firm might choose to reduce these 90 days to 60 days  by
requiring suppliers to locate nearby.  Additional  costs due to poor infrastructure  as
measured by increased inventory  would be 30 days while the actual costs are higher.
Third, high inventories can obscure efficiency problems.  Current thinking in the
manufacturing  and operations research field suggests that low inventories  make it easier
to trace problems in the production process as  Nahmias  [1997]  states in a discussion of
just-in-time  inventory management:
A popular analogy is to compare a production process with a river
and the level of inventory with the water level in the river.  When the
water level is high, the water will cover the rocks.  Likewise,  when
inventory levels  are high, problems are masked.  However,  when the water
levels (inventory) is low, the rocks (problems) are evident.  Because items
are moved through the system in small batches,  100 percent inspection is
feasible.
The objective of this paper is to report systematically  the high inventory holdings
in developing countries  and to impute their determinants,  pointing to policy interventions
to considerably reduce the required inventories  and so to improve country
competitiveness.  Section 2 of this paper provides  a brief theoretical overview  of why
firms hold inventory.  A model of firm inventory  holdings is presented to motivate the
empirical work.  Section 3 describes the inventory data we have collected.  Section 4
contains the estimations, which  show that inventories  are significantly higher in
developing countries due to poor infrastructure and market interference.  Section 5
concludes.
2.  Theoretical  Overview
Two characteristics  of economies  in developing countries lead us to expect them
to have higher inventories.  First, a poorly functioning  market can lead to shortages of
certain goods; firms expecting these shortages would stock up on inventories in
anticipation.  In the Soviet Union, for example, firms were known to maintain a high ratio
of raw materials inventories to finished goods inventories for this reason.  Chikan [1991]
has shown empirically that socialist countries held  a larger ratio of raw materials
inventories to finished goods inventories.  Second, poor infrastructure  increases
uncertainty  in delivery  schedules and increases the time it takes for an order to arrive,
causing firms to stock up in anticipation.
4We examine the effects of these two factors in language commonly used by
economists and operations researchers  in studying the behavior of inventories.  We first
explain intuitively the reasons why firms hold inventory at all.  We then model
mathematically the optimization  decision that the firm faces.  This model is useful for
understanding how poor infrastructure  and poor markets will affect inventory decisions.
The model also motivates the empirical  specifications.
The economics literature typically cites three theoretical reasons for why
businesses hold inventory:  production  smoothing, stockout avoidance,  and reduction of
transaction costs.  Blinder  [1991] gives examples of other reasons such as holding
inventories for display purposes or to speculate on or hedge against price  movements, but
the above three explanations are the most prevalent.
In the production smoothing model, firms have a rising marginal cost curve.
Firms seeking to minimize production costs in the face of sales that vary predictably over
time will produce a constant amount every month, accumulating inventories when sales
are below production and depleting inventories when sales exceed production.  Firms
select their inventory levels by weighing storage and financing costs against potential
savings from production optimization.  (See Blinder [1991]  and Fukuda and Teruyama
[1988]  on the empirical  validity of this model.)
The stockout motive presumes that demand  varies unpredictably over time and
that the firm faces penalties  in the form of loss of goodwill  or loss of potential sales if it
cannot satisfy demand immediately  out of inventory.  Firms hold inventory to meet this
unanticipated  demand.  While the production smoothing motive only explains why
manufacturers would keep finished goods inventories,  the stockout motive explains the
existence of retail inventories and raw materials inventories  as well.  The stockout motive
applies also if the uncertainty occurs not in demand but in the timing of deliveries.  Firms
concerned about stockout optimize inventory levels by trading off holding costs against
the likelihood of stockout  and the expected cost of a stockout.
The transaction  cost motive assumes that there are certain fixed costs to placing
an order or that there are economies of scale in ordering  in large batches.  When faced
with uncertain demand as in the stockout model, firms follow an (S,s) strategy.  As soon
as the inventory falls below  s, the firm places an order of a lot size necessary to bring the
inventory  back to S.  In determining the optimal lot size, firms weigh inventory holding
costs against savings from large  orders.  According  to Mosser [1991],  retail inventories
are usually managed by an (S,s) rule, as evidenced by its presence in textbooks on
purchasing, retailing,  and merchandising  as well as in trade journals and business reviews
which describe  implementations of the (S,s) rule using computers.
We present a variant of the (S,s) model called the (Q,R) model following the
notation  and description in Nahmias [1997]  in order to motivate the empirical  work
According to this (Q,R) model, whenever the firm's inventory reaches  a level R, it orders
a quantity equal to Q.  This model differs from the (S,s) model in that inventory  position
is assumed to be known at all times such that an order can be placed at exactly the time at
which inventory reaches R so that the order quantity  is always exactly Q.  The firm
5chooses Q and R in order to minimize the sum of three costs:  holding cost, transaction
cost, and stockout cost.  In order to simplify the model in Nahmias, we assume that the
ratio of Q to annual inventory  is fixed such that every firm places orders at equal
intervals.  This simplification allows us to focus  on the portion of inventory most relevant
to this analysis:  the buffer stock.  We also modify the model to include the value added,
which is necessary for our empirical  analysis.
We show below how the firm chooses the optimal buffer stock in a (Q,R) setting
by weighing holding cost against stockout or penalty cost.
The holding cost of the buffer stock during the year is the value of the buffer
stock multiplied by the interest rate.  In the (Q,R) model, an order is placed when the
inventory level reaches R and the new inventory  arrives after some time T expressed as a
fraction of a year.  This new inventory  is then expected  to arrive when the inventory  level
reaches R-XT.  Assume that each final good sells for $1  and it takes one unit of raw
materials with a value of (1-v),  where v is value added, to produce one final good.
Holding cost is then i*(1-v)*(  R-XT), where i is the interest  rate for borrowing working
capital.
Penalty costs are incurred whenever inventory level reaches  zero and total
penalty costs are proportional  to the value of the items that are not immediately available
for sale due to the shortage.  Under the (Q,R) model, inventory position is continually
reviewed and a new order is placed as soon as inventory reaches the R level.  Stockouts
only occur when the demand between  the time when an order is placed and when the
order is received turns out to be greater than  R.  If annual demand has a normal
distribution with mean k and standard deviation a, then the distribution of demand over
the lead time is normal with mean XT and standard deviation  aoW.  To simplify the
notation, the standardized  variate z  is defined as  (R - AT)/oVT.  The expected  value of
the shortage n(R) is given by:
n(R) = or#J(x  -z)(x)dx
where ¢(x) is the normal density function.  The shortage in  a year will be the shortage
incurred in one cycle, n(R), multiplied by the number of cycles  ?JQ.  Assuming that the
firms pays a penalty p for each unit of stockout in raw materials,  the expected annual
penalty cost will be pXn(R)/Q.
The sum of these two costs G(R) is:
G(R)  =  i(l - v)(R - 2T)  +  pAn(R) I Q
Differentiating this cost with respect to R and setting the derivative equal  to zero, we find
that the optimal solution must satisfy the following equation:
6I  ,z(_R - AT  Qi(l -v)
where  1() is the cumulative normal distribution.
This solution has three basic implications which are tested in the empirical  work.
First, the buffer inventory  R-XT is an increasing function of T and an increasing function
of the variance in T if T is stochastic.  It is easy to see from the second equation  that any
increase  in T will lead to an increase in R-XT.  The intuition is that a higher T increases
the distribution of demand during the lead time and the firm must maintain  a higher
reserve R.  It can also be shown that if T is stochastic, the demand variance  a used in the
model  can be replaced with a weighted sum of the variance of lead time and the variance
of demand.  It is evident from the equations  that increases  in this a, holding Q constant,
will lead to a corresponding increase in R-XT.  Firms keep more of a buffer stock in
response to the uncertainty surrounding demand and deliveries  during the lead  time.  We
interpret poor infrastructure  and poor functioning  markets as either increasing the lead
time T or the variance of lead time and expect, for this reason, that these country
characteristics would lead to higher raw  materials inventory.
Second, the optimal solution depends on value added.  High value added firms
will maintain  higher inventory positions than low-valued added firms.  This results from
the fact that holding costs of raw materials as a fraction of the value 'of the final product
are smaller for high value added firms.  For example, high-end restaurants probably never
run out of onions and computer manufacturers do not stock out of nuts and bolts.
Third, and more importantly for the empirical  analysis, there is an interaction
effect between value added and lead time or variance of lead time.  Any change in a or
imust be offset,by an equivalent percentile change  in R-XT.  The higher R-XT was
before the change, perhaps as a result of low v, the higher will be gross change in R-XT.
This type of interaction effect is predicted  in most models of inventory behavior.  By
testing for this interaction effect explicitly,  we are able exclude the effect of other
variables omitted  in our empirical  analysis.  For example, suppose we find that
inventories are correlated with poor functioning  markets.  It is possible, however,  that
poor functioning markets are correlated  with subsidized low interest rates for firms and it
is these low interest rates that are driving the results.  If we also find an interaction effect
between poor markets and value added, then we can exclude the low interest rate,
explanation  since the predicted  interaction effect between interest rates and value added
would be in the opposite direction.  (A change  in interest rates has more of an effect when
value added  is low, while a change in market function has more of an effect when value
added is high.)  Similarly, variables that affect p will lead to an interaction  affect of the
opposite sign as well.  For example, p might depend on the production technology used
because it is costlier to stop production  in a continuous process rather than a batch
'process.  By looking for an interaction effect rather than  a main effect, we can be
confident that differences in production technology a'cross countries do not drive our
results.
7In this way, we exclude  any omitted variables except those whose effect increases
with value added,  namely those that would affect T or a directly.  There are two such
factors.  First, developing countries which  import intermediate goods as manufacturing
inputs are likely to have higher inventory  levels because the import of raw materials
involves longer and more uncertain  delivery times.  We know, from a separate analysis
we have done of plant-level inventory data in the 1980s for few Latin American
countries'  that require firms to account separately for domestic and imported inputs,  that
inventories of imported inputs are much higher.  Second, demand may be more volatile
and less predictable in some countries, leading to a higher a.  We try to explicitly control
for both of these factors in our regressions.
There are a number of additional factors that ideally should be included in the
country-level analysis but cannot due to a lack of cross-country data.  First, the extent of
informatics technology and telecommunications development  in any given country can
also affect the level  and management of inventories by allowing a closer tracking of
levels, demand and trends.  Second, if developing countries were more likely to use FIFO
accounting while developed countries used LIFO'  accounting,  their inventory stocks
would appear to be higher, especially  in cases of high inflation.  Although we do not have
evidence by country on this issue, our research on this topic indicates that LIFO, although
allowed in the United States for tax purposes,  is rare in both developing  and other
developed countries (Nobes and Parker [1995]).  Other relevant factors  are the degree of
vertical integration,  the concentration of upstream  suppliers, production to stock vs.
production  to order, and the type of production technology.  Our test using the interaction
effect approach should eliminate the effects of some of these.
Our approach in this paper is that high inventories are an optimal response to
particular characteristics  of a developing country.  An alternative approach is that high
inventories represent firm inefficiency,  a result of poor management perhaps.  Even after
controlling for level of development,  it is possible that poor management of inventories
would be correlated  with poor functioning  markets because managers  in such countries
are likely to focus on rent seeking activities rather than productive activities.  By
examining interaction effects and also looking for correlations between our poor market
proxies and finished/process  inventories,  we check that our results do not result from this
factor.
3.  Data Description
It is difficult to obtain accurate data on inventory holdings for developing
countries.  The aggregate data reported in the national accounts are change in inventories
rather than the stock of inventories;  often these data are based not on an inventory  survey
but on the difference  between production and sales.  Since production  and sales are
measured  with errors,  inventory data based on the difference between these figures are
i This data on Chile, Colombia, and Mexico was provided  to us for use  at the World Bank by James
Tybout.  A description of the data is in Roberts and Tybout [1996].
2 In LIFO (Last-In First-Out)  accounting  when a good or raw material  is removed from inventory, the
accounting cost is the cost at which the last good or raw material was purchased.  In FIFO (First-In First-
Out) accounting, the cost of the oldest unit is used.
8highly inaccurate.  Nevertheless, our initial results from work with aggregate inventory
levels computed from the National Accounts data were not inconsistent with the stylized
observation  that developing countries hold more inventory than developed countries.  For
this study, we use more accurate  and disaggregated  data on inventories collected by
national statistics agencies.  Most national statistics agencies do have inventory  stock
data but do not publish it.  In order to report the size of the country's industrial
production, the statistics agency typically carries out a firm survey or census,  which asks
about total inventory holdings at the beginning or end of the year.  More detailed surveys
break down inventories  into three or more categories:  raw materials inventory,  goods-in-
process inventory,  and finished goods inventory.  Surveys also request data on gross sales
and on the gross value of inputs consumed.  A few countries do not provide data on raw
materials consumption and these countries were not included in the analysis of raw
materials  inventory.
Rather than surveying these statistics agencies ourselves to collect inventory  data,
we rely on a broad survey completed by the United Nations.  The UN, in its World
Programme of Industrial  Statistics, surveyed  the statistics departments  of countries
around the world, requesting  industrial data for 1973 and 1983.  Unfortunately,  this
program was discontinued after 1983.  In some cases, these data were provided for an
adjacent  year but not the year requested.  Table 2 lists the countries and the type of data
provided.  31  countries provided data on inventories for the 1973  survey and 43 countries
provided data on inventories for the 1983 survey, yielding  a database of inventory data
for 51 countries for one or two years.  Each country provided data according to 3-digit
ISIC codes,  which are listed in Table 3.
9Table 2:  IData Availabllity
Finished  25.  Japan  1973  0 119  0 078
Raw  and26Koe193  98
1973  1983  Materials  Proces  26.  Korea  1973  1983  0  0 091
Country  Survey  Survey  Coef.  Coef.  27.  Kuwait  1974  1983  0 251  0 094
1.  Australia  1973  *  1984  0.183  0.105  28.  Luxembourg  1973  0205  0089
2.  Austria  1973  1983  0.192  0  119  29.  Macau  1983  0 137  0.087
3.  Bangladesh  1982  0.265  0.134  30.  Malaysia  1983  0 185  0.107
4.  Barbados  1983  0.222  0.082  31.  Malta  1983  0.257  0A109
5.  Brazil  *  1973  _  0.090  32.  Mexico  1983  0 151  0.097
6.  Canada  1973  0.156  0 111  33.  Netherlands  1974  0128  0.118
7.  Chile  *1973  1983  0.246  0097  34.  NewZealand  1983  0  181  0.113
8  Colombia  1973  1983  0 203  0.108  35.  Norway  1973  1983  0 169  0.145
9.  Costa Rica  *1980  0.140  36.  Panama  1973  1981  0.287  0.092
10.  Cyprus  1972  1981  0.209  0.129  37.  Peru  1973  *1982  0.307  0.123
11.  Czechoslov  1973  1983  0.233  0.138  38.  Philppines  1972  1983  0232  0.115
12  Denmark  1973  1983  0 193  0.117  39  Poland  1983  0243  0071
13  Ecuador  1983  0.280  0.132  40  Portugal  1971  =  0252  0.177
14.  Egypt  _  1979  0.354  0 148  41.  Puerto Rico  1972  0 162  0.088
15.  El Salvador  1983  0.295  0 109  42.  Qatar  1983  0221  0082
16  FIJij_  1983  0227  0 131  43.  Singapore  1973  1983  0 182  0 105
17.  Finland  1983  0.272  0.146  44  Sweden  1973  1983  0183  0.166
18.  Guatemala  1974  *  1983  0.277  0  108  45.  Thailand  1982  0.236  0.118
19.  Honduras  1975  0.298  0.106  46.  Turkey  1970  1983  0  189  0.116
20  Hong Kong  1973  1983  0.135  0.058  47.  UK  1973  *1983  0.164  0135
21.  Hungary  1973  1983  0.298  0 092  48.  US  1972  *1982  0 112  0 112
22  Iceland  1983  0 147  0.050  49.  Venezuela  1984  0242  0097
23  Iran  1983  0.304  0 129  50.  Zambia  1973  0.255  0.129
24  Israel  1972  1982  0.211  0 113  51.  Zimbabwe  1983  0 305  0.124
*  Indicates that a raw materials  inventory ratio could not be calculated because of a lack of data on raw material consumption
Since the median  industry coefficient  is very close to zero, the country  coefficients can be interpreted as inventory ratios for the
median industry.  For example,  Korea  has the lowest raw matenals inventory ratio.  The coefficient of 0.106 indicates that the median
industry in the U.S  holds about 0.106 of a year or 39 days of raw matenals  inventory.
10Table 3:  3 Digit ISIC Codes
3  MANUFACTURING
31  Food, Bevgs.  & Tobacco
311/2  Food products
313  Beverages
314  Tobacco
32  Textiles, Apparel, Leather
321  Textiles
322  Apparel, excl. footwear
323  Leather and  prods. n.e.c.
324  Footwear
33  Wood,  Prods. & Furniture
331  Wood & wood products
332  Furniture, etc.,  non-metal
34  Paper & Prods., Printg., Pub.
341  Paper and products
35  Chemicals and Petrochem.
351  Industrial chemicals
352  Other chemical products
353  Petroleum refineries
354  Petroleum, coal products
355  Rubber products
356  Plastic products n.e.c.
36  Non-Metallic  Minerals
361  Pottery, china, etc.
362  Glass and products
369  Other non-metallic  prods.
37  Basic Metals
371  Iron  and steel
372  Non-ferrous metals
38  Metal Prods., Mach., Equip.
381  Metal prods. excl. machin.
382  Machinery excl. electric.
383  Electrical machinery
384  Transport equipment
385  Professional goods
39  Other Manufacturing Ind.
390  Other Manufacturing  Ind.
11Ideally, we want to know the average number of days of inventory  held in each
industry  and country and compare this figure across countries.  Such data, however,
would be difficult to obtain even for the United States because collection of such data
would require daily surveys of inventory holdings  across firns.  Instead,  a good estimate
(assuming the firm doesn't stock out often) of average  days of inventory is the stock/flow
ratio at a particular point in time.  We calculate inventory ratios at the end of the year
(EOY) as follows:
Raw Materials Inventory ratio (EOY) = Raw Materials Stock (EOY)
Raw Materials Consumed
Final & Process Inventory ratio (EOY) = Total Stock (EOY) - Raw Materials Stock (EOY)
Sales
Beginning-of-year  inventories were also reported, permitting the calculation  of another
set of inventory ratios.
Implicit in these calculations  is the assumption that inventory  levels at a particular
point in time are representative  of average inventory  levels.  Since the data are for the
entire industry, inventory  cycles of individual  firms are not important.  We do not have to
worry that one firm places  its orders early in the month as long as another firm orders late
in the month.  Nevertheless, if inventory  cycles are correlated between firms, then the
estimate of inventory  levels would be inaccurate.  For example, if firms consistently  run
out of inventory after Christmas, then using end-of-year  inventory levels would
underestimate  average inventory levels.  Empirically,  inventories, at least in developed
countries,  are cyclical  and measuring inventory  at any particular time may underestimate
or overestimate the average inventory  level of that country;  a country that appears  to have
high inventory levels may simply be at the top of the cycle.
The high rates of inflation in many developing countries  lead to additional biases
in the inventory level measurements.  For example,  under a constant annual  inflation rate
of 10%, real output of $100, an inventory  level of 20% and a FIFO accounting  system,
nominal output would be about $105  and inventory  levels, as measured by the above
formulas,  would be 19% in the beginning of the year and 21% at the end of the year.3
We compensate  for these problems in part by using both beginning-of-year and end-of-
year inventories  and also using two years for the same country when available.
4.  Analysis of Determinants of Raw Materials lnventoiry
The statistical  analysis of our inventory  data consists of four parts.  First, we
confirm that inventories  in developing countries are generally higher.  This relationship is
often assumed to be true, but to our knowledge,  has never been shown systematically.
Second,  we analyze the determinants of high inventories  in a cross-country  framework.
Controlling for level of development, we show that countries with poor functioning
3 BOY inventory would be 20 and EOY inventory would be 22.  20/105 is about  19%  and 22/105  is about
21%.
12markets and poor infrastructure have higher raw materials inventories.  Third, we show
that these findings are robust to controls for country fixed effects by testing for the
interaction effect predicted  in the mathematical  model.  We use our industry level data to
show that the inventories  of higher value added industries are more affected  by poor
markets and poor infrastructure.  Finally, we discuss the possibility that overall
inventories are not affected  because inventories are merely shifted upstream from
finished good inventories to raw materials inventories.  We find few significant
correlations  between finished goods inventories and our proxies for poor markets and
infrastructure.  This finding actually confirms our primary results because,  theoretically,
poor infrastructure  and poor markets should primarily affect raw materials inventories.
Since there are a number of omitted variables that should affect both types of inventories,
the lack of a correlation between our independent  variables and finished good inventories
demonstrates that these omitted variables are not responsible for our results.
A.  Inventories and level of  development
Simple summary statistics of inventories  provide an indication of the magnitude
of the difference of inventories across countries.  The median raw materials inventory
ratio  in our sample over all countries is .21 which means that the median industry holds
enough inputs to cover two and a half months of production.  For comparison, the median
industry in the United States, the country which we expect to have one of the lowest
inventories, had a raw materials inventory  ratio of .11  in 1972 representing  less than one
and a half months of use.4 For final and process goods inventory, the situation appears
somewhat different, at least when the data are examined in aggregate.  The median  for
the whole sample is .08 while this number  is .09 for the United States.  These two sets of
inventory ratios, raw materials and finished goods, are only weakly positively correlated
with a correlation coefficient of 0.25.
Rather than just looking at the median industry, we would like a country-level
measure of inventories  that takes all the data into account.  The difficulty is that
inventories are likely to vary by industry.  For example, the food processing  industry is
likely to have low raw materials inventories because the raw materials for this industry
are highly perishable.  Since the distribution of industrial production across industries
will vary from country to country,  simply aggregating  all inventories to the country level
would produce misleading results.  Instead,  we model the inventory ratio to be a function
of its industry and country  and estimate the effect of country separate  from industry.  We
regress inventory ratios on industry and country dummy variables  as follows where i and
c index industries and countries covered:
4  10% of our dataset has raw materials  ratios greater than  .5 and 2% has ratios greater than  1. Lumpiness
and volatility in commodity markets are the most likely explanations  of these ratios.  For most of our
analysis we drop any data with raw materials greater than  .5 although our results do not depend on the
choice of this particular cutoff.  More than half of the data for industry 314 (Tobacco processing) exceeded
.5.  Omitting industry  314 from the regressions entirely does not affect our results.  The remainder  of
datapoints  with raw materials inventory greater than .5 are broadly distributed  over all  industries.  Egypt,
Kuwait and Panama  had a disproportionate  share of these inventories,  but excluding these countries also
does  not significantly  affect the results.  For the finished goods and process inventory ratios, 99% of this
data are less than 0.35.
13Inventory ratio,c  = E  ,8  IndustryDummy,  +  Y  Country Dummy'  + etc
We perform these estimations separately for raw materials inventory ratios and
finished/process  inventory ratios and report the two sets of resulting country coefficients
in Table 2 (third and fourth columns).  The range of coefficients for raw materials  is quite
large, with Korea having the lowest coefficient of 0.106 and Egypt having the highest
ratio of 0.354.  This range represents a difference  in inventory  stock of almost three
months.  For finished/process inventories, the differences in inventories is smaller.
Iceland has the lowest country coefficient of 0.050 while Portugal has the highest
coefficient of 0.177, representing a difference of about one and a half months.
In order to assess the relationship between inventories  and level of development,
we graph the country coefficients y against each country's GDP/capita in Figure 1, Panels
A and B.  For raw materials inventories,  the graph shows that country coefficients are
negatively correlated  with GDP/capita.  We confirm this relationship using a univariate
regression with country  coefficients as the dependent variable and log GDP/capita as the
independent variable (See first row of Table 6.) The regression finds a coefficient with a
negative sign that is significant at the 1% level.  For finished\process inventories, the
relationship  from the graph is unclear.  A univariate regression (not reported) finds a
negative coefficient but the relationship is not statistically significant.
B.  Cross-country  analysis of the determinants  of raw materials  inventories
Controlling for level of development,  there are differences in country coefficients.
For example, Mexico and Hungary have drastically different raw materials inventories
despite being very close in terms of GDP/capita.  Which characteristics  of developing
countries  lead them to maintain higher raw materials inventories?  We hypothesize,  as
explained in Section 2, that poorly functioning markets and poor infrastructure  are the
primary causes. We use nine proxies for poorly functioning markets:  bureaucratic  delay
index, corruption, business regulation, government consumption/GDP,  state-owned
enterprises in the economy, transfers & subsidies/GDP, public sector
employment/population,  bureaucratic  quality, and taxes/GDP.  For infrastructure,  we use
six proxies:  telephone mainlines per person, infrastructure quality, paved road
length/surface  area, total road length/surface area,  paved roads as % of total roads, and
failed calls. Table 4 contains descriptions and sources for these variables and Table 5
presents summary statistics.
14Figure 1:  Graphs of Inventory Ratios  vs. GDP/capita
Panel  A:  Raw  Materials Inventory
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Log of Real PPP GDP/capita
The y-axis displays the country coefficients obtained from a regression of raw materials inventory ratios on country and industry dummy variables.  The
coefficients  should be interpreted  as representing relative ratios of inventory holdings.  For example,  the difference  between inventory ratios in Egypt and Korea
(0.379-0.104) indicates  that manufacturing  firms in Egypt hold on average  0 275 or about 3  months of raw materials stock more than firms in Korea.
15lPanel B:  Final and Process lInventory
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The y-axis displays the country coefficients obtained from a regression of finished goods and process  inventory  ratios on country and industry dummy  variables.
The coefficients should be interpreted  as representing relative  ratios of inventory holdings.  For example,  the difference between  inventory ratios in Portugal and
Iceland  (0.169-0.055) indicates that manufacturing  firms in Portugal  hold on average 0.114  or about  I months of raw materials  stock more than firms in Iceland.
16Table 4:  Description of Explanatory Variables
'  . 4  ,  ,  '!''  ~  ,,  '  ',  - .'  ,  tv  "  Free  Market,MeWsures ;
Bureaucratic  delay  An indicator of bureaucratic  delays (red tape).  Low ratings indicate lower levels of red tape in the
Index  bureaucracy of the country.  Scale from 0 to  10.  The data  are the average of the years between  1972
and 1995.  Source:  BERI's Operation  Risk Index as used in La Porta et al [1999].
Corruption  Corruption in government  index.  Low  ratings indicate "high government  officials are likely to
demand special payments"  and "illegal payments are generally expected throughout lower levels of
government"  in the form of "bnbes connected  with import and export licenses, exchange  controls, tax
assessment,  policy  protection or loans."  Scale from 0 to  10.  Source:  Political  Risk Services (ICRG),
1985.
Business regulation  A rating of regulation policies related to opening a business  and keeping open  a business (on a scale
from I to 5).  Higher score  means that regulations are straight-forward and  applied uniformly  to all
businesses and that regulations  are less of a burden to business.  Source:  Holmes, Johnson,  and
Kirkpatrick,  1997, as used in La Porta et al  [1999].
Govemment  General government  consumption includes all current expenditures for purchases of goods and
consumption/GDP  services by all levels of government, excluding  most government enterprises.  It  also includes capital
expenditure on national defense  and security  Data are averages over the years  1971-1985
SOEs in the economy  Index of State-Owned  Enterprises as a share of the economy  (scale  from 0 to 10).  Higher scores
include countries with less govemment-owned  enterprises which are estimated to produce less of the
country's output.  As the estimated  size and breadth of the SOE sector increases, countries are
assigned  lower ratings.  Average  of the score  for the years  1975-1995.  Source:  Gwartney, Lawson,
and Block,  1996, as used in La Porta et al  [1999].
Transfers and  Total government transfers and subsidies as a percentage of expenditure  multiplied by government
subsidies/GDP  consumption  as a percentage of GDP.  "Subsidies  and other current transfers include all unrequited,
nonrepayable  transfers on current account  to private and public enterprises,  and the cost of covering
the cash operating deficits of departmental enterprise  sales to the public  Data are  shown  for central
government only. General  government consumption includes  all current expenditures  for purchases  of
goods and services by all levels of govemment, excluding most government  enterprises.  It also
includes capital expenditure  on national defense and security."  Data are the average of available years
over the period  1971-1985.
Public sector  Average  for the ratio of public sector employment  in general  government to total population for the
employment/populati  years 1976-1996.  General government employment includes employment in "all government
on  department offices, organizations  and other bodies which  are agencies  or instruments  of the central or
local  authonties  whether accounted for or financed in, ordinary or extraordinary  budgets or extra-
budgetary  funds.  They are not solely engaged  in administration  but also  in defense  and public order,
in the promotion of economic growth and in the provision of education, health  and cultural  and social
services."  Source:  Schiavo-Campo, de Tommaso, and Mukherjee,  1997,  as used in La Porta et al
[1999].
Bureaucratic  quality  ICRG data for  1985.
Taxes/GDP  Tax  revenue comprises compulsory,  unrequited, nonrepayable receipts for public purposes collected
by central governments.  It includes interest collected on tax arrears  and penalties collected on
nonpayment or late payments  of taxes  and is  shown net of refunds and other corrective transactions.
Data are shown for central government  only.
'  z  ,  -,j!  '  K  . z='i  '  . - - :  '  ,  '.-,  Infrastr  ct  reMea  frff 5  ' -,-j  - i  ,  -
Telephone mainlines  Telephone  mainlines are telephone  lines connecting  a customer's equipment to  the public switched
per person  telephone  network.  Data are the averages of available years over the period  1971-1985.
17Infrastructure  quality  Assessment of the "facilities"  for and ease of communication  between headquarters  and the operation,
and within the country,"  as well as the quality of the transportation.  Average data for the years 1972
to  1995.  Scale from 0 to  10 with higher scores for superior quality.  Source:  BERI's Operation Risk
Index as used in La Porta et al [1999].
Paved road  Paved roads  are roads that have been sealed  with asphalt or similar road-building  materials.  Data are
length/surface  area  averages  of available  years over the period 1971-1985.  Source: Canning  [1998].
Total  road  Total  roads are any public roads in the country.  Data  was obtained from intemational  and national
length/surface  area  sources and  are averages of available  years over the period  1971-1985.  Source: Canning [1998].
Paved roads,  %  of  Paved roads are roads that have been sealed with  asphalt or similar road-building materials.  Data are
total  averages  of available years over the period  1971-1985.
Failed calls  Data are averages  of available  years over the period  1971-1985.  Source: Canning [1998].
Control Vaniables
Log GDP per capita  Logarithm of Pu' (tVF  per capita measured  in 1985 dollars.  Data are the averages over the period
197 1-1985.  Source:  Penn World Tables (Mark 5.6).
Export growth  Annual growth rate of exports of goods and services based on constant local  currency. Aggregates  are
based on constant  1995 U.S. dollars. Exports of goods and services represent the value of all goods
and other  market services provided  to the world. Included is the  value of merchandise, freight,
insurance, travel, and other nonfactor  services. Factor and property income (formerly called factor
services),  such as investment income, interest,  and labor income, is excluded.  Data are the averages
for available years over the period 1971-1985.
Lending interest rate  Lending interest rate is the rate charged by banks on loans to prime customers.  Real lending rate is
computed using GDP deflator.  Data are the average over all available years in the penod 1971-1985.
Imports/GDP  Imports of goods and services represent the value of all goods and other market services provided to
the world. Included  is the value of merchandise,  freight, insurance, travel,  and other nonfactor
services.  Factor and property  income (formerly called factor services), such as investment income,
interest, and labor income,  is excluded.  Data are the averages for available years over the period
1971-1985.
Data source for explanatory variables  is the  1999 World  Development Indicators on CD-ROM  unless otherwise noted.
Descnptions of variables quoted from La Porta et al [1999], World Development Indicators, or Canning[1998]
18Table 5:  Summary of Explanatory Variables
Variable  |Countries  |Mean  |Std. Dev.  |Min  |Max
Free Market Measures
Bureaucratic delay  index  31  5.06  1.33  2.68  7.49
Corruption  47  3.87  1.62  0.00  6.00
Business regulation  47  3.17  0.89  1.00  5.00
Gov.  cons. / GDP  49  0.15  0.06  0.02  0.38
SOEs in the economy  45  4.91  2.35  0.00  10.00
Transfers & subsidies/GDP  43  10.55  7.99  0.90  29.00
Public sector emp./pop.  34  5.28  4.02  0.93  17.40
Bureaucratic quality  47  3.74  1.71  1.00  6.00
Taxes/GDP  46  0.21  0.10  0.05  0.46
Infrastructure  measures
Tel mainlines  per person  5i  0.15  0.15  0.00  0.57
Infrastructure  quality  31  6.02  1.83  2.50  9.15
Paved road length/surface  area  44  0.50  0.87  0.00  3.16
Total road length/surface area  48  0.68  0.98  0.03  3.73
Paved roads, % of total  50  0.57  0.33  0.00  1.00
Failed calls  35  0.19  0.21  0.00  0.69
Control  Variables
Log GDP per capita  51  8.50  0.77  6.93  10.12
Export growth standard deviation  42  10.53  7.49  2.67  41.83
Lending interest rate (real)  35  0.08  0.16  -0.17  0.81
Imports/GDP  48  0.38  0.29  0.09  1.74
We test the effects of these variables separately.  We regress the country
coefficients calculated previously on the log of GDP/capita and one of the nine poor
market proxies  or six poor infrastructure proxies.  The results are shown in Table 6 Panel
A.  For the poor market proxies, all nine coefficients  are of the expected sign and eight of
them are significant at the 10%, 5%, or even  1% levels.  The magnitude of the estimated
coefficients  that are significant indicate that a one standard deviation  worsening in market
function leads to a  11% to 37% increase in raw materials inventory ratios relative to U.S.
levels.  All six proxies for infrastructure are of the expected  sign but only two are
significant.  Telephone mainlines per person is significant at the 10%  level and
infrastructure quality is significant at the 1%  level.  A one standard-deviation  change in
these two variables is estimated to increase  raw materials inventories by  18%  and 37%,
respectively.
19Not all the independent variables we use are available for every country in the
sample.  As a result, although the coefficients  and predicted magnitudes differ between
different proxies,  we cannot be certain whether these differences are due to the different
effects on inventories of these variables or the fact that the results are skewed by the use
of different  samples of countries.  In order to clarify this issue, we repeat the regressions,
restricting the sample to the set of countries for which  all variables are available. We do
this first for 24 countries for which we have all nine proxies for poorly functioning
markets  and then again for the 20 countries for which  we have all six proxies for poor
infrastructure.  The results  are show in Table 6 Panel B.  Sample  selection does not
appear to be responsible for differences  in coefficients  across different proxies as
evidenced by the fact that the relative magnitudes  of the predicted coefficients are largely
unchanged.  Out of the nine poor market indicators,  the bureaucratic delay index still has
the largest effect on raw materials inventories.  Taxes/GDP and government
consumption/GDP have some of the lowest effects in both sets of regressions.  Since
these variables  are probably the poorest proxies of poorly functioning markets, the results
are not surprising.  Out of the six infrastructure  indicators,  the infrastructure quality index
still has the largest effect.  In both sets of regressions,  indicators related to total road
length and paved road length have relatively  smaller effects.  These results suggest that
the infrastructure  shortcomings that lead to high inventories cannot be overcome by
simply building more roads.  We do not have data on the quality of roads, but it is
possible that delays along existing  roads due to poor management rather than the lack of
sufficient  roads are the primary problem.
20Table 6 Panel A:  Regressions  on Raw Materials Country Coefficients:  Baseline
Univariate Regressions
Exp.  Log  Adj. R-
sign  Indep. Var  GDP/capita  R-Squared  Squared  Obs.  Magnitude
I)  Log real PPP  -0.044***  0.3356  0.3214  49
GDP/capita  (0.009)
___________  ____________  ___________-30%
-lienfark6t  -
-ihdicesi  '  - ;  I
2)  Bureaucratic  -0.031***  -0.002  0.4722  0.4331  30
delay index  (0.010)  (0.020)  -37%
'3)  Corruption  -0.011I*  -0.026*  0.3773  0.3476  45
(0 007)  (0.013)  _  -16%
4)  Business  -0.019*  -0.033***  0.4140  0.3861  45
regulation  (0.010)  (0.011)  -15%
5)  Gov. cons. / GDP  +  0.210*  -0 054***  0.4112  0.3844  47
(0.119)  (0.010)  11%
6)  SOEs in the  -0.0055*  -0.051***  0.4632  0.4363  43
economy  (0.0031)  (0.009)  -12%
7)  Transfers  &  +  0.0025**  -0.0697***  0 4922  0.4655  41
subsidies/GDP  (0.0011)  (0.0117)  1  8%
8)  Public sector  +  0.0059**  -0.0698***  0.5111  0.4786  33
emp./pop.  (0.0026)  (0.0131)  21%
9)  Bureaucratic  -0.0164***  -0.0193  0.4550  0.4291  45
quality  (0.0054)  (0.0115)  -25%
10)  Taxes/GDP  +  0.0891  -0 0509***  0.3822  0.3521  44
(0.0787)  (0.0104)  . 8%
-Infrastructure  ..- ,. .-  -*.;,l-  ;-*i1  ..s' 
measures  _  _  .__X._._:X..
11)  Tel mainlines  -0.1315*  -0.0239*  0.3791  '0.3521  49
per person  (0.0732)  (0.0142)  -18%
12)  Infrastructure  -0.0226***  0 0008  0.4440  0.4029  30
quality  (0.0081)  (0.0222)  -37%
13)  Paved  road  -0.0068  -0 0458***  0.3692  0 3368  42
length/surface  (0.0094)  (0.0107)
area  . -5%
,14)  Total road  -0.0094  -0.0412***  0.3593  '0.3294  46
length/surface  (0.0076)  (0 0095)
area  - -8%
15)  Paved roads, %  -0.0263  -0.0379***  0.3484  0.3194  48
of total  (0.0266)  (0.0109)  -8%
16)  Failed calls  +  0.0584  -0.0346***  0.2922  0.2450  33
(0.0363)  (0.0111)  __  _  11%
*  Significant  at the  10% level; **Significant  at the 5%  level;  ***Significant at the 1% level
Magnitude is calculated  as coefficient*std dev of indep variable/United States median  inventory ratio
Each row represents  a regression of the following form:
Raw materials country coefficient = P0 + 1 1  *Independent  varnable + P32*Log  GDP/capita +  e
21Table 6 Panel B:  Univariate Regressions on Common Countries
Log  Adj. R.
Exp. sign  Indep. Var  GDP/capita  R-Squared  Squared  Obs.  Malritude
.Free  market indices.  ,  --
(I)  Bureaucratic delay  -0.0370**  0 0117
index  (0.0132)  (0 0235)  0.4605  0.4091  24  -44%
(2)  Corruption  - 0.0051  -0 0521
(0.0142)  (00307)  0.2617  0 1914  24  7%
(3)  Business regulation  -0.0393**  -0 0274*
____  _  (00174)  (1 0156)  0.4032  0 3464  24  -31%
(4)  Gov  cons  /GDP  +  03188  -00549***
._______  (0.2459)  (0 0179)  0.3122  0 2467  24  17%
(5)  SOEs  in the  -0.0120**  -0.0344**
economy  (0.0044)  (0.0138)  0.4537  0.4017  24  -25%
(6)  Transfers &  +  0 0036**  -0.0661***
subsidies/GDP  (0.0013)  (0 01602  0.4529  0.4007  24  26%
(7)  Public  sector  +  0.0064*(  -0 0649***
empipop  (0 0029)  (0.0175)  0 3949  0.3372  24  23%
(8)  Bureaucratic  -0 0168  -0 0145
quality  (0.0129)  (0.0263)  0 3129  0.2475  24  -25%
(9)  Taxes/GDP  +  0.2565**  -0.0537***
(0.1002)  (0.0144)  0.4339  0.38  24  23%
Infrastructure
m  easures  _  ,___._  ._  ,._._._X_
(10)  Tel mainlines  per  -0 1417  -0 0019
person  (0.1253)  (0.0328)  0 2762  0.1911  20  -19%
(I1l)  Infrastructure  -0.0191**  0 0065
quality  (0.0080)  (0 0220)  0 4175  0 349  20  -31%
(12)  Paved road  -0 0161  -0.0274
lengWsurface  area  (0 0135)  (0.0164)  0 2824  0.1979  20  -12%
(13)  Total road  -0 0164  -0.0263
length/surface  area  (0 0103)  (0 0157)  0.3227  0.243  20  -14%
(14)  Paved roads, %  of  -0 0507  -0 0193
total  (0 0363)  (0.0186)  0 302  0.2198  20  -15%
(15)  Failed calls  +  0 1365***  -0 0272*
_____  (0.0443)  (0 0129)  0 501  0 4423  20  26%
* Significant  at the 10% level; **Significant at the 5% level;  ***Significant at the 1% level
Magnitude  is calculated as coefficient*std.dev  of indep variable/United  States median inventory ratio
Each  row represents  a regression of the following  form:
Raw materials  country coefficient =  f30 +  1 *Independent variable + (32*Log GDP/capita + e
Testing for Other Components.
i)  Import Intensity and Demand Uncertainty. Two factors other than markets
and infrastructure  that might cause inventories to be large are import intensity
and demand uncertainty.  We repeat the regressions with controls for these
two factors using as proxies imports/GDP and the standard deviation of export
growth rates.  The results of these regressions  are shown in  Table 6 Panel Cl.
These control variables are not available for all the countries for which we
have inventory data.  In order to be able to evaluate the effects of adding the
control variables in a consistent sample of countries,  we also show in  Table 6
Panel C2 a regression on the restricted  sample of countries but without the
two control variables.  In most regressions the coefficient  on imports/GDP  is
not significant and often of the wrong sign.  An exception is the regression
that uses the bureaucratic delay index where the coefficient on imports/GDP  is
positive and significant at the 5% level; including this variable increases  the
22predicted effect of bureaucratic  delay from 42% to 64%.  The coefficient for
standard deviation of export growth rates is positive,  as expected, in  14 of the
15 regressions  and is significant at the 5%  level in two of these regressions.
In general,  adding the two control variables do not seem to affect our primary
results.  We have also tried two alternate measures of demand uncertainty, the
standard deviation of economic growth rates, and the inflation  rate, a measure
of general economic uncertainty.  These variables were not significant and did
not affect the results.
Table 6 Panel Cl:  Univariate Regressions  with Control Variables
Standard  Dev.
Exp.  Log  Of export  R-  Adj.  R-
sign  Indep. Var  GDP/capita  ImportslGDP  growth rates  Squared  Squared  Obs.  Magnitude
Free  market  - ,_
indices,  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _
(1)  Bureaucratic  -0 0543***  0 0273  0 0755**  -0 0009
delay index  (0.0143)  (0 0228)  (0 0346)  (0 0014)  0 6044  0 5357  28  -64%
(2)  Corruption  0 0081  -0 0577**  -0 0095  0.0021
(0 0119)  (0.0227)  (0 0305)  (0 0013)  0 4715  0.4093  39  12%
(3)  Business  -0 0286**  -0 0274**  0.0354  0.0011
regulation  (0.0134)  (0 0132)  (0 0316)  (0.0013)  0.5165  0 4596  39  -23%
(4)  Gov  cons  /GDP  +  02026  -0.0491***  -00016  00019
(0 1247)  (0 0111)  (0 0268)  (0 0011)  0 5019  0 4450  40  11%
(5)  SOEs in the  -0 0058*  -0.0442***  0 0041  0 0018
economy  (0 0032)  (0 0109)  (0 0283)  (0 0011)  0 5169  0 4600  39  -12%
(6)  Transfers &  +  00031 ***.  -0 0635***  0.0053  0.0028**
_____  subsidies/GDP  (0 0011)  (0 0118)  (0 0266)  (0 0011)  0 5827  0 5322  38  22%
(7)  Public sector  +  0 0063**  -0 0659*t*  0 0016  0 0017
____  emp./pop  (0 0029)  (0 0149)  (0 0314)  (0 0020)  0 5397  0 4661  30  22%
(8)  Bureaucratic  -0 0106  -0 0276  0.0000  0.0012
quality  (0 0077)  (0.0163)  (0 0275)  (0 0012)  0 4927  0.4330  39  -16%
(9)  Taxes/GDP  +  0  1930**  -0 0514***  -0 0027  0 0026**
(0.0842)  (0 0109)  (0 0272)  (0 0011)  0 5360  0.4814  39  17%
-'Infrastructure  '  =  ..  ,  . . ,,  ,.  . .
.measures  '  '  __,,
(10)  Tel mainlines  per  -0 0763  -0 0313  -0.0017  0.0015
person  (0 1001)  (0 0202)  (0 0275)  (0.0012)  0 4731  0 4129  40  -10%
(I1l)  Infrastructure  -0 0223**  0 0015  0 0206  0 0006
quality  (0 0101)  (0 0253)  (0.0341)  (0 0015)  0 4695  0 3772  28  -36%
(12)  Paved road  _
length/surface  -0 0195  -0 0397***  0 0207  0 0015
area  (0 0180)  (0 0130)  (0 0406)  (0 0012)  0.4816  0 4148  36  -15%
(13)  Total road  ,
length/surface  -0 0176  -0.0402***  0 0207  0 0015
____  area  _______  (0.0124)  (00116)  (00342)  (00012)  0.4996  0.4408  39  -15%
(14)  Paved roads, %  of  -0.0146  -0.0417***  0 0044  0 0017
total  (0 0332)  (0 0124)  (0  0307)  (0.0012)  0.4673  0 4064  40  -4%
(IS)  Failed calls  +  0 0464  -0 0333**  -0 0226  0.0025
at.the10%  level;  (0 0384)  (0 0158)  (0 0253)  (0 0018)  0 4799  0 3854  27  9%
*  Significant  at the  10% level; **Significant at the 5%  level, ***Significant at the 1% level
Magnitude  is calculated  as coefficient*std  dev of indep vanablefUnited  States  median inventory ratio
Each row represents  a regression  of the following form
Raw matenals country  coefficient = 00 +  PiI *Independent  vanable + P2*Log GDP/capita +  03*1mports/GDP+  04*stddevgrowth  +  e
23Table 6 Panel C2:  Univariate Regressions on Matched  Countries
Exp.  Log  Adj. R-
Free_________~ . sign  Indep. Var  GDP/capita  R-Squared  Squared  Obs.  Magnitude
P666  -arket<" 
. indices  ' ..  >.  _'__._---,_  - 1_  ._.  _.  _  ,  _  _.  _
1)  Bureaucratic  - -0 0353***  0.0032
delay index  (0.0104)  (0.0209)  0.5222  0.484  28  -42%
:2)  Corruption  - -0.0003  -0.0516**
(0.0102)  (0.0216)  0.4297  0.3981  39  0%
'3)  Business  - -0 0230**  -0.0346***
regulation  (0.0109)  (0.0123)  0.4859  0.4573  39  -18%
4)  Gov. cons. /GDP  +  0.1883  -0.0571***
(0.1258)  (0.0102)  0.4619  0.4328  40  10%
5)  SOEs in the  - -0.0057*  -0.0521***
economy  (0.0032)  (0.0097)  0.4817  0.4529  39  -12%
'6)  Transfers &  +  0.0024**  -0.0702***
subsidies/GDP  (0.0011)  (0.0120)  0.5036  0.4752  38  17%
'7)  Public sector  +  0.0057**  -0.0704***
emp./pop.  (0.0027)  (0.0136)  0.527  0.492  30  20%
8)  Bureaucratic  - -0.0132*  -0.0282*
quality  (0.0071)  (0.0161)  0.4794  0.4505  39  -20%
9)  Taxes/GDP  +  0.1274  -0.0589***
(0.0816)  (0.0109)  0.4622  0.4323  39  11%
Infrastructure  -. - M
measures  '-,  -.-.  x  -.  . . -
10)  Tel  mainlines  - -0.1097  -0.0319
per person  (0.0961  (0.0200)  0.4487  0 4189  40  -15%
11)  Infrastructure  -0.0224**  -0.0010
quality  (0.0084)  (0.0237)  0.4574  0.414  28  -36%
12)  Paved road
length/surface  -0.0161  -0.0472***
area  (0.0131)  (0.0116)  0.4508  0.4175  36  -12%
13)  Total road
length/surface  -0.0154  -0.0474***
area  (0.0102)  (0.0105)  0 4691  0.4396  39  -13%
14)  Paved roads, %  -0.0215  -0.0473***
of total  (0.0292)  (0.0117)  0.4375  0.4071  40  -6%
15)  Failed calls  +  0.0374  -0.0487***
I_  1_  _  (0.0381)  (0.0126)  0.4165  0.3678  27  7%
* Significant at the  10% level;  *"Significant at the 5% level;  ***Significant  at the  1% level
Magnitude is calculated as coefficient*std.dev  of indep variable/United States  median  inventory ratio
Each row represents  a regression  of the following form:
Raw materials country coefficient =  30 +  31 *Independent  variable + 02*Log GDP/capita + e
ii) Real Interest Rates.  We have also tried including the real interest in the regressions.
This variable is available-for only 35 countries  and thus significantly restricts the sample.
Estimations  (table omitted) found this variable to be of the expected sign in most
regressions  but not significant in any of them.  Bureaucratic  delay and infrastructure
quality were still significant and had a large  effect, but fewer of the other market proxies
were significant.  We found that this resulted from the restriction  in sample size,  not the
actual  effect of the control variable.  Since, in many developing countries in the 1  970s
and  1980s, nominal interest rates were fixed and inflation  rates could be one to ten times
as large as the fixed interest rates,  we expected  to find a large range of interest rates
resulting in a larger effect on inventory ratios.  As Table 5 shows there was indeed a large
24range of interest rates.  One explanation  for the lack of an effect is that the interest rate
we use, the official lending rate to prime customers as reported to international
organizations, has little relation to the actual  rates at which manufacturing  firms can
borrow.  Many purchases of raw materials  are characterized  by the use of trade credit,  the
terms of which are complicated  and may not closely follow market rates.
We also try to compare the effects of poor infrastructure versus the effects of poor
markets.  In many cases,  the proxies for these two factors are highly correlated,  making it
difficult to disentangle  the effects.  The proxies for which we obtained  the largest effects
were bureaucratic  delay and infrastructure quality; a standard deviation change in each of
these increased inventories by 37% of U.S. levels.  We run a multivariate  regression to
estimate the effects of each of these two variables  (table omitt*ed).  In this regression, the
magnitude of bureaucratic  delay is 27%  and the magnitude of infrastructure  quality is
12%, but neither variable is significant and it is hard to draw definite conclusions.  We
also tried running regressions  with other pairs of proxies as well as a separate test using
factor analysis, but the results were inconclusive.
C.  Inventories in high vs. low value added industries
As discussed  in the theoretical overview,  a number of variables may affect
inventories for which  we have not been able  to control due to  a lack of systematic cross-
country data on these factors.  We deal  with these issues by running regressions that
control for country fixed effects and take advantage of the industry level inventories data.
As shown in the theoretical  model of Section 2, there is an interaction effect between
value added and delivery time and uncertainty  in delivery time.  We hypothesize that
poorly functioning markets and poor infrastructure  increase both delivery time and
uncertainty in delivery time and, for this reason,  we expect to find an interaction effect
between our proxies for poor markets and infrastructure  with value added.  We run
regressions of the following form:
Inventory ratiol,c  = 0,  ValueAdded + 02 -ValueAdded *  Market/InfrastructureProxy  +
LA  *  IndustryDummy,  +  E  .Country Dummy,  +  ,c
I  c
The results of these fixed country-effect regressions  are shown in Table 7.  As
predicted by the theoretical model, the coefficient  (01)  on value added is positive and
significant at the 1% level  in all 15 regressions.  The coefficients we are primarily
interested in are the 02s.  Of the nine indicators for free markets,  seven are significant
with all but one significant at the 1% level.  (Variables are highly significant due to the
large number of observations.)  Of these seven indicators,  three are of the wrong sign:
government consumption/GDP,  taxes/GDP.  The magnitudes  (coefficient  * standard
deviation of variable) of the coefficients on these variables  are  all lower than the
magnitudes of the coefficients for which we obtained the right sign.  Our strongest result
in the cross-country regressions came from the bureaucratic  delay index and the
interaction  regressions finds the largest effect here as well.  Other large effects of the
right sign come from corruption, business regulation,  and bureaucratic quality.  The
25model fares better with the infrastructure proxies.  We obtain significant results for 4 of
the 6 proxies and all are of the correct sign.  The strongest effect comes from the
infrastructure  quality index, just as in the cross-country regressions.  Since  we might also
expect to find an interaction effect with import intensity and demand uncertainty,  we
have repeated the regressions  (tables omitted) with these additional two interaction
effects.  Our results were not significantly  affected.  The general results from these fixed-
country effect regressions  confirm the importance  of free markets  and good infrastructure
D.  Finished/Process  Inventories
An important critique of the above analysis is that we are looking at inventory
along merely one point of the supply chain.  Perhaps  inventories are merely shifted from
one point in the chain to another.  Under just-in-time inventory systems, for example,
large firms are able to reduce their own raw materials inventory often at the expense of
increasing their suppliers'  finished goods inventories  (Fandel and Reese [1991]).  We test
for this possibility by repeating the cross-country regressions,  using as the dependent
variable finished/process  country coefficients rather than the raw materials country
coefficients.  A finding of a negative correlation between finished/process inventories and
poor markets and poor infrastructure would indicate that these factors lead to shifting
away from finished/process  inventories towards raw materials inventories.
As shown in Table 8, we find evidence of shifting for only one out of the fifteen
proxies, namely telephone  mainlines per person.  The coefficients on the proxies for
which we obtained our strongest results on raw materials  are small and not statistically
significant.  We find little to no evidence of shifting of inventories in these regressions.
Nevertheless, this check on shifting of inventories  is incomplete  in several ways.
First, we do not have inventory data on non-manufacturing industries and therefore
cannot check for the existence of shifting from upstream suppliers such as agriculture,
mining, or forestry, or to downstream customers such as the wholesale and retail sectors.
Second, we do not have data on the inventories of upstream suppliers and downstream
customers abroad, and, for this reason, cannot test for shifting across country borders.
26Table 7: 'Regressions on Raw Materials Inventory with Interaction Effect
Exp.  Indep.  Value  Adj.  R.
sign  Var  Added  R-Squared  Squared  Obs.  Magnitude
Free  rmarket"'  . ,r  - I
-indices '  _  ___'___,_  _  _________,
:1)  Bureaucratic  -0.0705***  0.5814***
delay index  (0 0097)  (0.0554)  0.5236  0.5083  1868  -0.088
2)  Corruption  -0.0368***  0.3468***
(0.0074)  (0.0324)  0.4766  0 4612  2552  -0.042
3)  Business  -0.0629***  0.4405***
regulation  (0.0111)  (0.0441)  0.4731  0.4575  2535  -0.051
4)  Gov. cons. / GDP  +  -0.7387***  0.3653***
(0.1740)  (0.0294)  0.4779  0.4621  2556  -0.034
5)  SOEs in the  0.0028  0.1935***
economy  (0.0048)  (0.0272)  0.4802  0.4649  2495  0.004
6)  Transfers &  +  -0.0021  0.2768***
subsidies/GDP  (0.0014)  (0.0205)  0.4914  0.476  2353  -0.011
7)  Public sector  +  -0.0093***  0 2302***
emp /pop.  (0.0027)  (0 0186)  0.5237  0.5079  1905  -0.026
8)  Bureaucratic  - -0.0315***  0.3151 ***
quality  (0.0074)  (0.0299)  0.4753  0.4598  2552  -0.036
9)  Taxes/GDP  +  -0 2197*  0.3104***
(0.1188)  (0.0294)  0.4738  0.4574  2387  -0.015
_  Infrastructure  .,-  ;.  -.  .;_  s, 
.measures  . ..  -."  - ,  '.
:10)  Tel mainlines  - -0.4501***  0.2695***
per person  (0.0754)  (0 0175)  0.47  0.4543  2673  -0.043
11)  Infrastructure  - -0.0397***  0.4368***
quality  (0.0074)  (0.0480)  0.5172  0 5018  1868  -0.060
12)  Paved road  -
length/surface  -0 0263**  0.2815***
area  (0.0134)  (0.0188)  0.4824  0.4664  2325  -0.012
13)  Total road  -
length/surface  -0.0101  0.2615***
area  . (0.0114)  (0.0190)  0.4695  0.4535  2529  -0 005
'14)  Paved roads, %  - -0.2191***  0.3531***
of total  _  _  (0.0340)  (0 0276)  0.4718  0 4562  2600  -0 050
15)  Failed calls  +  0.0444  0.2353***
(0.0617)  (0.0212)  0.4449  0.4275  2008  0.006
* Significant at the  10% level; **Significant  at the 5% level,  ***Significant at the  1% level
Magnitude is coefficient  on independent  variabte multiplied by the standard deviation of that independent  variable
Each row represents  a regression of the following form:
Raw matenals  Inventory  = a + ,3, indep.varva + 02  va  + y  industry effect + e  country effect + e
27Table 8:  Regressions on Finished/Process Country Coefficients
Exp.  Log  Adj. R-
sign  Indep. Var  GDP/capita  R-Squared  Squared  Obs.  Magnitude
Log real PPP  -0.0069  0.0451  0.0257  51
GDP/capita  (0.0045)
. Free maiket  ,  ,,._,  _  _ 
indices  .'  '  ___,_.___.
(1)  Bureaucratic  0.0017  -0.0002
delay index  (0.0052)  (0.0104)  0.0077  -0.0632  31  2%
(2)  Corruption  0.0047  -0.0129*
(0.0032)  (0.0065)  0.0819  0.0401  47  8%
(3)  Business  -0.0066  -0.0003
regulation  (0.0051)  (0.0060)  0.0575  0.0146  47  -7%
(4)  Gov. cons  /  +  0.1756***  -0.0098**
GDP  (0.0562)  (0.0046)  0.1979  0.163  49  12%
(5)  SOEs in the  -0.0020  -0.0031
economy  (0.0016)  (0.0050)  0.0477  0.0023  45  -5%
(6)  Transfers &  +  0.0013**  -0.0101
subsidies/GDP  (0.0006)  (0.0061)  0.1247  0.0809  43  12%
(7)  Public sector  +  0 0045 ***  -0 0142**
emp./pop.  (0.0012)  (0.0060)  0.3197  0.2759  34  20%
(8)  Bureaucratic  0.0031  -0.0104*
quality  (0.0029)  (0.0062)  0.0607  0.018  47  6%
(9)  Taxes/GDP  +  0.0121  -0.0046
(0.0394)  (0.0052)  0.0184  -0.0272  46  1%
Infrastructure  . ,.  - .
measures
(10)  Tel mainlines  0.0824**  -0.0195***
per person  (0.0358)  (0 0070)  0.1403  0.1044  51  14%
(11)  Infrastructure  0.0019  -0.0019
quality  (0.0041)  (0.0114)  0.0116  -0.059  31  4%
(12)  Paved road
length/surface  -0.0039  -0.0034
____  area  (0.0044)  (0.0050)  0.0426  -0.0041  44  -4%
(13)  Total road  .
length/surface  -0.0044  -0.0045
area  (0.0038)  (0.0047)  0 0611  0.0194  48  -5%
(14)  Paved roads,  0 0090  -0.0090
% of total  (__  0.0129)  (0.0055)  0.0552  0.015  50  3%
(15)  Failed calls  +  -0.0245  -0.0048
(0.0224)  (0.0071)  0 0467  -0 0128  35  -6%
*  Significant  at the  10% level;  **Significant at the 5% level;  ***Significant at the 1% level
Magnitude is calculated as coefficient*std.dev  of indep variable/United  States median inventory ratio
Each row represents  a regression of the following  form:
Finished/Process  country coefficient  =  30 + 11 *Independent variable + P2*Log GDP/capita + e
28The results of the regressions  on finished/process  inventories actually support our
primary hypothesis.  Certain factors, such  as demand uncertainty  and accounting system,
should affect both raw materials inventory and finished goods inventory.  Infrastructure
and poor markets, on the other hand, should affect mostly raw materials inventories.  If
our findings of a significant relationship between  raw materials  inventories and poor
market and infrastructure proxies  were a result of omitted variable  bias, then we would
also obtain the same relationships between finished/process  inventories and these proxies.
Since we do not see the same relationships,  we can be confident that omitted variables  are
not driving the result.
5.  Conclusion
This paper has introduced a new cross-country dataset on inventories  at the
industry level into the literature, documenting significant holdings of inventory in
developing countries.  Given the high costs of capital in developing countries, usually in
the 15%  to 30% rate, plus the other associated costs of inventories,  the impact on unit
costs and competitiveness  are enormous.  We have explored some broad causes of high
raw materials  inventories  across countries  in the  1970s and 1980s and can confirm the
validity of two causes, infrastructure and poor markets, which have been suggested  in
case studies.  Since high inventories are still a problem today in many developing
countries, this paper should be useful  in understanding the obstacles faced by
manufacturing firms in these countries and from a policy standpoint,  it indicates the
direction to take to address the problem.  The policy implications  are clear, improvements
in infrastructure,  roads, ports and telecommunications  can have a significant  impact in
reducing  inventories, particularly when accompanied  with appropriate  and effective
regulation.  Likewise the development and deregulation of associated markets can also
have a significant impact on inventories,  reducing the costs of doing business.
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